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In the 1939 case of Pepper v. Litton,1 the U.S. Supreme Court an-
nounced that equitable subordination, the power of the bankruptcy court
to change the order in which creditors will be paid by a bankrupt debtor,
must be used "to the end that fraud will not prevail, that substance will
not give way to form, [and] that technical considerations will not prevent
substantial justice from being done.",2 Exercised by early courts as an ap-
plication of their equity powers in bankruptcy, equitable subordination
was aimed at piercing formal and legal subterfuges to ensure that a bank-
ruptcy estate was properly distributed among similarly situated creditors.
Courts flexibly examined the conduct of creditors, originally focusing on
insiders, to prevent superficially legal behavior from creating unfair or
inequitable advantages in priority. In 1978, Congress formally recognized
the importance of equitable subordination by codifying a provision for it
at section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.3 Congress specifically re-
frained, however, from defining or limiting the courts' application or de-
velopment of the doctrine, leaving the shaping of this remedy to the
courts themselves.
Historically, bankruptcy courts have restricted the exercise of equita-
ble subordination to situations in which creditors had engaged in
"inequitable conduct."' Unfortunately, however, the courts have been
unable to define inequitable conduct in any meaningful way.5
t f.D., Yale Law School, 1998; MSC (Management), Oxford University, 1993; A.B.(Economics), Harvard College, 1992. Many thanks go to Professor Robert Gordon, Gerard Ma-
gliocca, Ryan Bounds, Maxim Kulikov, Allison Moore, Laura Ahn, Richard Primus, and Tom
Shakow for their help with previous drafts and much more.
1. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
2. Id at 305.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994).
4. See In re 80 Nassau Associates, 169 B.R. 832, 837 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing
requirement of inequitable conduct).
5. See id at 839 ("[T]hese definitions [of inequitable conduct] provide little guidance; they
describe a standard that is rarely if ever met."); 2 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY, § 6-
93, at 256 (1992) (characterizing inequitable conduct as "very slippery concept with little predic-
tive value").
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In response to concerns about the inconsistent or excessive applica-
tion of this power to the detriment of creditors ex post as well as debtors
ex ante, a number of courts in recent years have turned to a bright-line
rule that I will call the "formalist contract-rights presumption": Creditor
conduct in accordance with specific rights explicitly stated in a written
contract is presumptively not inequitable. This rule resurrects the lan-
guage and doctrine of formalist contract to define a zone of conduct that
courts will presume not inequitable. This Note argues that this bright-line
rule should be reformulated or rejected as inconsistent with contract and
bankruptcy law, unjustified, and fundamentally misguided.
First, the presumption relies on an excessively limited concept of con-
tract rights and is thus inconsistent with important strands of modern
contract law. This inconsistency itself makes the presumption legally un-
justified, undermines the goals of equitable subordination, and generates
perverse and confusing incentives for creditors. Furthermore, the pre-
sumption's exclusive focus on formal contract provisions is also inconsis-
tent with bankruptcy preference law. This inconsistency, too, creates con-
flicting incentives and undermines the goals of preference law. Most
importantly, the presumption subverts the fundamental purpose of equi-
table subordination, which is to provide flexible and equitable remedies
for technically valid but equitably unacceptable behavior. The presump-
tion undermines the need for clear justification, accuracy, and flexibility
in guiding the application of equitable subordination. Moreover, the pre-
sumption undermines the objectives of efficiency and fairness espoused
by its advocates.
This Note, therefore, suggests that the formalist contract-rights pre-
sumption be amended to incorporate an inquiry into the course of deal-
ings between creditor and debtor and an explicit standard for identifying
the acceptable boundaries of creditor conduct.
Part II of this Note will briefly outline the development of the for-
malist contract-rights presumption in equitable subordination. Part III
will demonstrate that the presumption is fundamentally inconsistent with
modern contract and bankruptcy preference law. Accordingly, this Part
will argue that the presumption is thus both legally unjustified and unde-
sirable. Part IV will argue that the presumption subverts the fundamental
purpose of the power of equitable subordination by placing inconsistent
and excessively formalistic limits on what must remain a flexible equity
power. Part IV will also evaluate specific arguments in favor of the pre-
sumption on the basis of its purported efficiency, fairness, and precision,
ultimately concluding that enforcing the presumption will in the end un-
dermine rather than promote these objectives. Part IV will then propose
a new and more accurate approach for identifying inequitable conduct.
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Part V will conclude.
II. THE RISE OF THE FORMALIST CONTRACT-RIGHTS PRESUMPTION
In their struggle to define the limits of equitable subordination, courts
have created the bright-line rule that a creditor's conduct within the writ-
ten terms of a contract will be presumed not inequitable. This Part de-
scribes the power of equitable subordination and its requirement of in-
equitable conduct. It then traces the courts' development of the formalist
contract-rights presumption, which considers only the limits of a con-
tract's express terms to determine whether a creditor has behaved inequi-
tably.
A. The Requirement of Inequitable Conduct
Equitable subordination is a dynamic concept. In a trilogy of early
cases,6 bankruptcy courts developed the power to change the priority of
payment of claims and interests in bankruptcy.7 Known as equitable sub-
ordination, this power was exercised by courts originally to prevent insid-
ers from using legal mechanisms to gain priority in the order of payment
of their claims against a bankrupt. Courts retained this power as an equi-
table mechanism for preventing legal formalism from subverting the eq-
uitable objective of equality of distribution in bankruptcy. As the Su-
preme Court's broadly worded proposition in Pepper v. Litton
demonstrates,8 equitable subordination was designed to provide courts
with the ultimate flexibility to ensure fairness in the administration of a
bankruptcy estate. 9
Few formal guidelines exist for the exercise of equitable subordina-
tion. Codified in section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,0 this power is
subject only to the bankruptcy courts' understanding of the "principles of
equitable subordination."'1 The Code never defines these principles,
6. The seminal cases establishing the bankruptcy courts' power of equitable subordination
are Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co. (the "Deep Rock" case), 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); and Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211
(1948).
7. Bankruptcy courts are courts of limited equity powers; courts and commentators alike
consider equitable subordination to be an exercise of those powers. See Benjamin v. Diamond
(In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 698-99 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[B]ankruptcy courts have tradi-
tionally been regarded as courts of equity... and it is settled that they possess the power 'to
prevent the consummation of a course of conduct by [a] claimant which ... would be fraudulent
or otherwise inequitable' by subordinating his claims to the ethically superior claims asserted by
other creditors." (citations omitted)).
8. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9. This purpose will prove important to my discussion of the desirability of the formalist
presumption. See infra Section IV.A.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994).
11. See id. ("[Courts may] under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for pur-
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however; in fact, legislative history indicates that Congress intended the
interpretation of section 510(c) to "follow existing case law and le[ft] to
the courts development of th[e] principle [of equitable subordination]. '' 2
Over time, courts have generally recognized a requirement of inequi-
table conduct as a prerequisite to exercising equitable subordination. 3
The seminal case of In re Mobile Steel Co.14 provides the best expression
of this formulation. In Mobile Steel, the Fifth Circuit held that a creditor's
claims would be equitably subordinated only if three conditions were
met: (1) The claimant had engaged in some kind of inequitable conduct;
(2) the misconduct had resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt
or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; and (3) equitable sub-
ordination of the claim was not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code."S
A consistent definition of inequitable conduct, central to the meaning
of Mobile Steel, has continued to elude the courts. Courts have identified
three general categories of inequitable conduct: "(1) fraud, illegality, or
breach of fiduciary duties; (2) undercapitalization; and (3) a claimant's
use of the debtor as a mere instrumentality or alter ego."16 These catego-
ries encompass a large number of equitable subordination cases and
identify general areas of conduct for a court to examine; courts, however,
do not consider these categories exhaustive, 7 and thus they do not pro-
vide a court with concrete rules for determining when marginal behavior
is inequitable. In particular, courts have little guidance in determining
whether creditors are exerting too much control or merely enforcing their
contract rights zealously."8
poses of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all
or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest... [or] order that any
lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate.").
12- In re Virtual Network Services Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1248 (7th Cir. 1990) (reporting
statement of Representative Edwards and similar statement of Senator DiConcini).
13. Courts have recently begun to carve out some specific exceptions to this rule; these ex-
ceptions, however, have been limited. See Scott M. Browning, Note, No Fault Equitable Subor-
dination: Reassuring Investors That Only Government Penalty Claims Are at Risk, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 487, 504-21 (1993) (discussing rise of "no-fault" equitable subordination of tax
penalty claims); Peter A. Christou, Note, Federal Tax Claims in Bankruptcy and the Doctrine of
Equitable Subordination: United States v. Noland and United States v. Reorganized CF & I
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 50 TAX LAW. 237, 246 (1996) (discussing continued ambiguity over
whether creditor misconduct is required under doctrine of equitable subordination).
14. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
15. See id. at 700.
16. In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. (Clark Pipe 11), 893 F.2d 693, 699 (5th Cir. 1990).
17. See Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination
as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAW. 417, 430-47 (1985) (discussing fraud or
misrepresentation, domination and control, and other inequitable conduct as categories of
creditor misconduct that have caused courts to apply equitable subordination).
18. See In re 80 Nassau Associates, 169 B.R. 832, 837-40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (reviewing
standard for inequitable conduct and characterizing it as "'slippery' and unpredictable").
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As a result of this ambiguity, nonmanagement creditors in particular
have become quite concerned about the scope of the power of equitable
subordination. Commentators DeNatale and Abram note that "[t]he
most commonly feared equitable subordination cases arise in connection
with allegations of domination and control on the part of a nonmanage-
ment creditor, generally a financial institution."' 9 Practitioners have ar-
gued strongly in favor of better understood rules in related contexts.2
Courts wrestling with the concept of equitable subordination have simi-
larly noted concerns generated by the uncertainties involved .
A number of courts have reacted to these concerns about ambiguity
by creating what I shall call the formalist contract-rights presumption.
Beginning with the surprising self-reversal of the Fifth Circuit in the case
of the bankruptcy of the Clark Pipe & Supply Company in 1989-90,
courts have begun to hold that creditor conduct within the express writ-
ten terms of a contract is presumptively not inequitable.
B. The Development of the Formalist Contract-rights Presumption
1. Highlighting the Presumption: Clark Pipe I & II
In In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. (Clark Pipe 1),2 a Fifth Circuit panel
engaged in a fact-based, relational inquiry into the conduct of a nonman-
agement creditor, Associates Commercial Corp. ("Associates"). The
court ultimately determined that Associates's exertion of near complete
control over the debtor's operations in a manner detrimental to the
debtor's unsecured creditors constituted inequitable conduct.f The court
first examined Associates's conduct towards and relationship to the
debtor, Clark Pipe. It found that Associates effectively controlled Clark
Pipe's operations by manipulating its cash flow and that Associates delib-
erately used this power to induce Clark Pipe to convert its inventory to
pay Associates's claims at the expense of other creditors.24 After detailing
this level of control, the Clark Pipe I court concluded that the facts were
similar enough to other patterns of inequitable conduct to warrant equi-
19. See DeNatale & Abram, supra note 17, at 432.
20. See id. at 447 (discussing concern of practitioners and lenders at growing numbers of
equitable subordination cases).
21. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting (Kham fl), 908 F.2d 1351,
1356 (7th Cir. 1990) (expressing concern that equitable subordination and good faith and fair
dealings leaves interpretation of duties of parties to contracts "in the discretion of a bankruptcy
judge assessing the situation years later").
22. 870 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1989).
23. See id. at 1030-31.
24. See id at 1024, 1029.
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table subordination.2 Based on this factual inquiry, the court affirmed
the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Associates had acted inequitably,2
upholding the bankruptcy and district courts' equitable subordination of
Associates's claims.2'
In January 1990, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its previous decision in
Clark Pipe I and substituted a new opinion, In re Clark Pipe & Supply
Co. (Clark Pipe 11), 2' that substantially reversed its earlier holding. In
contrast to Clark Pipe I, the court based its reversal on the proposition
that a creditor's conduct pursuant to rights explicitly stated in a written
agreement is presumptively not inequitable. Because Associates exerted
its control under the rights outlined in its loan agreement with Clark, the
court on reexamination chose not to characterize this level of control as
"total" or involving "inequitable conduct":
In our prior opinion, we agreed with the district court and the bankruptcy
court that, as a practical matter, Associates asserted total control over Clark's
liquidation, and that it used its control in a manner detrimental to the unse-
cured creditors. Upon reconsideration, we have concluded that we cannot say
that the sort of control Associates asserted over Clark's financial affairs rises
to the level of unconscionable conduct necessary to justify the application of
the doctrine of equitable subordination. We have reached our revised con-
clusion primarily because we cannot escape the salient fact that, pursuant to its
loan agreement with Clark, Associates had the right to reduce funding, just as it
did, as Clark's sales slowed.
2 9
The court relied primarily on its finding that all of Associates's activi-
ties were within the rights established by the loan agreements:
In our original opinion, we failed to focus sufficiently on the loan agreement,
which gave Associates the right to conduct its affairs with Clark in the man-
ner in which it did.... [O]ur careful examination of the record does not re-
veal any conduct.., that was inconsistent with the loan agreement, irrespec-
tive of what [the loan agent's] personal motive may have been.30
The test that emerges from the court's reasoning is based not on the
substantive level of creditor control, but on whether such conduct is
within the rights detailed by a written agreement between creditor and
25. See id. at 1029.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 1031. In considering the requirements for equitable subordination, the court
found that this inequitable conduct had injured other creditors, see id at 1030-31, and that equi-
table subordination in this case would be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's policy of pro-
moting equality of distribution, see id. at 1031.
28. In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. (Clark Pipe 11), 893 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990).
29. Id. at 699-700 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 700-01. In support of its position, the court made much of the fact that "[t]he
agreement provided that Associates could reduce the percentage advance rates at any time in
its discretion," id. at 700, and that the agreement had been executed in 1980, before any finan-
cial trouble, at arm's length, see id.
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debtor executed at arm's length.31
In Clark Pipe II, the Fifth Circuit articulated the following principle:
If a creditor has acted within the rights articulated in a contract with a
debtor, the creditor will be presumed not to have engaged in inequitable
conduct for the purposes of equitable subordination even if it exercised
"powerful and ultimately severe" 32 control to the detriment of other
creditors. I call this rule the "formalist contract-rights presumption." The
rule is formalist in that it looks at the letter of the contract and not at past
conduct between the parties under it. It is presumptive in that it assumes
that conduct within defined contract rights is not inequitable.
2. Asserting Formalism: Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First
Bank of Whiting
The Seventh Circuit reiterated and elaborated upon this presumption
in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting (Kham i1),3
in which it reversed a district court's finding of inequitable conduct.34
The bankruptcy court's opinion in the case (Kham 1)3' demonstrated a
fact-based inquiry into the conduct of a creditor bank. The bank had in-
duced the debtor to declare Chapter 11 bankruptcy in return for provid-
ing additional credit and converting its letters of credit to super-priority
status.36 It had then terminated that line of financing and forced the
debtor's other creditors to draw down on the letters of credit.37 The bank-
ruptcy judge held in an evidentiary hearing that the bank had acted ineq-
uitably in terminating its line of credit and inducing the debtor's suppliers
to draw on the letters of credit.3 The judge concluded that these draws
had converted the bank from an unsecured lender to a super-secured
lender, to the detriment of other creditors.39 Ultimately, the bankruptcy
court in Kham engaged in a fact-based, pattern-matching inquiry into the
nature of the bank's conduct, determining that the bank had acted ineq-
31. The court did return in part to the fact-based, pattern-matching technique it used in
Clark Pipe L See Clark Pipe II, 893 F.2d at 701-02 (contrasting facts of this case with In re
American Lumber Co., 5 B.R. 470 (D. Minn. 1980)). However, at the end of its analysis, the
Fifth Circuit returned to its core argument regarding contract rights: "Associates' control over
Clark's finances, admittedly powerful and ultimately severe, was based solely on the exercise of
powers found in the loan agreement." Id. at 702.
32. Id.
33. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
34. See id at 1356-59.
35. In re Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc. (Kham 1), 97 B.R. 420, 428 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989).
36. See id. at 422.
37. See id
38. See Kham II, 908 F.2d at 1354.
39. See id.
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uitably by analogy to the case of KM.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.4° In
KM.C., a creditor was held to have violated the requirement of good
faith by suddenly and inexplicably refusing, within the explicit terms of
the contract, to make further advances under a line-of-credit agreement. 1
The court in Kham I held that the bank's inexplicable refusal to advance
further funds was a similar breach of good faith and fair dealings and thus
was grounds for equitable subordination.42
Following reasoning similar to that of the Clark Pipe II court, the
Seventh Circuit in Kham II reversed the district court's affirmation of the
bankruptcy court's decision, holding that conduct under the express
terms of a written contract would not, as a rule, be considered inequita-
ble:
Debtor submits that conduct may be "unfair" and "inequitable" for [the]
purpose [of determining whether to apply equitable subordination] even
though the creditor complies with all contractual requirements, but we are
not willing to embrace a rule that requires participants in commercial trans-
actions not only to keep their contracts but also do "more"-just how much
more restin in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the situation
years later.
4W
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation precluded all inquiries save those
directed to the letter of the contract itself: "Firms that have negotiated
contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the great dis-
comfort of their trading partners, without being mulcted for lack of 'good
faith."'" The Seventh Circuit very strongly limited its inquiry to the for-
mal provisions of the contract; even the bankruptcy judge's finding that
the bank had propelled the debtor into bankruptcy by conditioning its
loan on filing for bankruptcy was irrelevant.4 ' Thus, the Seventh Circuit
in Kham 11 clarified the emerging bright-line rule: Conduct is presump-
tively not inequitable if it falls within the parties' rights under the con-
tract, where the contract is interpreted as strictly adhering to its written
letter.
3. Restating the Presumption: The Legacy of Clark Pipe II and
Kham II
A series of cases has begun to apply the formalist contract-rights pre-
40. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
41. See id. at 760-63.
42. See Kham 1, 97 B.R. at 428.
43. Kham 1908 F.2d at 1356.
44. Id. at 1357. The Seventh Circuit went on to argue that the letter of the contract itself is
determinative and that the notion of good faith in contract deals only with "gap filling." See iL
45. See iL at 1358 ("Although Debtor contends, and the bankruptcy judge found, that
Bank's termination of advances frustrated Debtor's efforts to secure credit from other sources,
and so propelled it down hill, this is legally irrelevant so long as Bank kept its promises.").
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sumption established by Clark Pipe II and Kham I. First, a number of
courts have denied actions for equitable subordination based on the rea-
soning in Clark Pipe II and Kham II, holding that creditors' conduct has
not been inequitable if it has fallen within written contract rights.4" For
example, in In re M. Paollela & Sons, Inc.,47 the court held that a credi-
tor's close monitoring of a debtor, including daily calls, control over all
receivables proceeds, and a sudden request for repayment of long-
outstanding and well-monitored debts that severely impaired the debtor's
ability to pay other creditors, did not constitute inequitable conduct.4
Citing Kham II, the court argued that the creditor's exercise of its con-
tractual right to demand repayment at any time-even in the face of
findings by the bankruptcy court that the creditor had altered (1) its
method of dealing with the debtor, (2) its method of obtaining information,
and (3) the type of information it obtained from the debtor-was not ineq-
uitable, since it was part of the written terms of the contract.49
Second, even in cases where courts have engaged in more detailed dis-
cussion of the facts, they have used the formalistic contract reasoning of
Kham II and Clark Pipe II to find a creditor's refusal to lend additional
funds not inequitable0 or to characterize creditor conduct as not impermis-
sibly controlling.51 For example, in In re Clemens, the court found that
46. See, e.g., United States Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc.
(In re United States Abatement Corp.), 39 F.3d 556,562 (5th Cir. 1994) ("We reached this con-
clusion based primarily upon the fact that the contract between the lender and borrower ex-
pressly permitted [lender's conduct].") (citing In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. (Clark I1), 893
F.2d 693, 702 (5th Cir. 1990)); Sloan v. Zions First National Bank (In re Castletons, Inc.), 990
F.2d 551, 559 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding bankruptcy court's decision that conduct was not in-
equitable because creditor "was simply exercising the contract rights it had, and there's nothing
wrong with that") (citing Clark II, 893 F.2d at 701); Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re
M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Kham II, 908 F.2d at 1357);
Davlin v. Fidelcor Business Credit Corp. (In re Southern Standard Fittings Co.), 1991 WL
197018, at *3 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding creditor's actions not inequitable because they were
"permitted under the loan documents") (citing Clark Pipe II, 893 F.2d at 702); NBD Park Ridge
Bank v. SRJ Enterprises, Inc. (In re SRJ Enterprises, Inc.), 151 B.R. 189, 197 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993) ("[B]ecause there is no duty of 'kindness' among nonfiduciaries, mere enforcement of
contract rights will not give rise to a claim for equitable subordination.") (citing Kham II, 908
F.2d at 1357).
47. Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
48. See id. at 119.
49. Id. at 120 ("'Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the
letter."') (quoting Kham II, 908 F.2d at 1357 (Easterbrook, J.)).
50. See In re After Six, Inc., 177 B.R. 219, 232 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Kham II); Un-
secured Creditors' Committee v. Banque Paribas (In re Heartland Chemicals, Inc.), 136 B.R.
503,519 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992) (citing Kham II, 908 F.2d at 1357).
51. See Clemens v. West Milton Bank (In re Clemens), 197 B.R. 779, 795 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that because creditor conduct was pursuant to contract, creditor was not an in-
sider and did not behave inequitably) (citing Paolella, 161 B.R. at 120); see also Lynn v. Conti-
nental Bank (In re Murchison), 154 B.R. 909, 913 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that credi-
tor did not become subject to higher standard for insiders in preference action because its
controlling conduct was contractual) (citing Clark II, 893 F.2d at 700-01); Boyd v. Sachs (In re
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"there was significant evidence that the [creditor] controlled much of the
affairs of the [debtor] during some significant time periods, 52 while the
debtor was not in technical default." It held, however, that the creditor's
conduct was not impermissibly controlling against the "background"' of
Paolella, which "carefully pointed out... that 'a creditor does not act ineq-
uitably in exercising its contractual rights.... ","
Finally, even in the rare cases where inequitable conduct is found,
courts have been forced to attack misconduct that occurs outside the terms
of the contract. 6 In In re Century Glove, Inc., for example, the court denied
a motion to dismiss a claim for equitable subordination.f The complaint
alleged that the creditor had engaged in inequitable conduct when it en-
tered into a plan with one of the debtor's officers to liquidate the debtor for
the exclusive benefit of the officer and creditor.58 An essential part of the
"plan" theory was the allegation that the creditor refused to waive the pro-
vision in the loan agreement that would have enabled the debtor to remove
the misbehaving and allegedly conspiring officer without triggering a de-
fault." The creditor argued that this conduct was not inequitable under the
reasoning of Clark Pipe II6 The court both agreed and disagreed. It fol-
lowed the formalist contract-rights presumption, holding that the creditor's
refusal in and of itself did not constitute inequitable conduct under Clark
Pipe 11.61 It reasoned, however, that because the refusal was part of a larger
conspiracy plan, the complaint successfully "allege[d] such other inequita-
ble conduct as Clark Pipe requires." 62 The Century Glove court was thus
forced under the presumption to look beyond the opportunistic refusal ac-
Auto Specialties Mfg. Co.), 153 B.R. 457,481 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) (citing Clark II).
52. 197 B.R. at 796.
53. Id.
54. 1&
55. Id. at 795 (quoting Paolella, 161 B.R. at 120).
56. See, e.g., Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re 604 Co-
lumbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1362 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding bank's misappropriation
of loan proceeds inequitable conduct in contrast to permissible contractual behavior under
Kham); Century Glove, Inc. v. Iselin (In re Century Glove, Inc.), 151 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1993) (finding that plan to liquidate debtor was distinguishable from permissible "mere
exercise of contractual rights" under Clark II); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bailey (In re Cutty's-
Gurnee, Inc.), 133 B.R. 934, 959 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1991) (holding that, under Kham, bank was
entitled to advance own interests to extent of contract terms, but that additional attempts to
take priority lien position despite notice of adverse claims was inequitable conduct); Aluminum
Mills Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc. (In re Aluminum Mills Corp.), 132 B.R. 869, 896 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that alleged creditor fraud was sufficiently more egregious than
"[m]erely enforcing the terms of a contract" to survive motion to dismiss under Kham).
57. See 151 B.R. at 335.
58. See id.
59. See id





tion itself to sustain the inequitable conduct complaint.
Thus, in cases of dramatic changes in creditor behavior, "significant
control" of the debtor, and even alleged conspiracy, the courts have re-
stated the formalist rule: Conduct under the rights specified by the written
terms of a contract is presumptively not inequitable.
III. CONFLICT WITH MODERN CONTRACT AND BANKRUPTCY
PREFERENCE LAW
The formalist contract-rights presumption should be rejected or re-
formulated because it is fundamentally inconsistent with important parts
of modem contract law and bankruptcy preference law. This Part dem-
onstrates that modem contract law recognizes concepts of relational con-
tract and good faith and fair dealings that require courts to look beyond
the express terms of a contract in evaluating the contract rights of the
parties. It then argues that the presumption's inconsistency with these
concepts renders it legally unjustified, undermines the goal of equality of
distribution, and creates perverse and confusing incentives. In addition,
this Part explains that bankruptcy preference law also recognizes and ap-
plies a relational approach to evaluating a creditor's conduct that goes
beyond the express terms of the contract. This Part then argues that the
presumption's inconsistency with bankruptcy preference law makes its
application unprincipled, creates conflicting and confusing incentives for
creditors within bankruptcy law, and undermines the important goals of
reducing the pressure towards bankruptcy and promoting equality of dis-
tribution.
A. Conflict with Modern Contract Law
1. The Modern Concept of Relational Contract and the Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealings
Unlike the formalist contract-rights presumption, modern contract
law recognizes and requires an inquiry into the relations between the
contracting parties to determine whether a party's conduct is within its
contractual rights.
First, modem contract law recognizes that contracts can be created,
modified, and properly interpreted through behavior. For example, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement) recognizes that the
terms of a final written contract can be interpreted using parol and ex-
trinsic evidence, including evidence of the two parties' course of dealing
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or performance." Specifically, the Restatement recognizes that in a con-
tract that involves repeated occasions for performance, one party's actual
course of performance and the other party's acceptance or acquiescence
in that performance are relevant to the interpretation of the contract." In
fact, the Restatement consistently includes an inquiry into the relationship
and course of dealings and performance with an exploration of the ex-
press contract terms themselves in its guidelines for determining the
meaning of a contract." Other sources of modem contract law such as the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) even recognize that a contractual
relationship between parties can be created and defined by their conduct
66alone and not merely by the terms of written contracts.
Second, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings in mod-
em contract law recognizes that evaluating the performance of a contract
requires an inquiry into more than simply the express contractual rights;
evaluating the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings requires
an inquiry into the performance and enforcement of those rights under
contract.
Modem contract law requires that courts examine both contractual
rights and the parties' exercise of those rights to determine whether a
contract has been breached. Under modem contract law in most jurisdic-
tions, "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." 67 Scholars have read
the scope of this obligation to include more than a mere adherence to the
letter of a contract. For example, in interpreting the duties of merchants
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981) (stating that the rules in aid
of interpretation of contracts include interpreting the course of dealings and performance of
parties to a contract in addition to contract's express terms); see also U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978)
(same).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-
208(1) (1978) ("Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it
by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be
relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.").
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981) (reporting priority of inter-
pretive sources, including parties' course of performance and course of dealing); see also U.C.C.
§ 2-208(2) (1978) (explaining that express terms of agreement, course of performance, and
course of dealing and usage of trade should be construed as consistent with each other when-
ever possible in interpreting contracts).
66. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1-3) (1978) (explaining that contracts can be formed by any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including mutual conduct recognizing an agreement, and that in-
definiteness of time of formation and of certain terms does not necessarily bar contract's forma-
tion); U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1978) ("Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract.").
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see also U.C.C. § 1-102 (1989)
("Every contract or duty within [the U.C.C.] imposes an obligation of good faith in its perform-
ance or enforcement."). But see English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983) (holding
that there is not an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract in Texas).
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under the U.C.C., Professor E. Allan Farnsworth stated three standards
that behavior under a contract must meet to fulfill the obligation of good
faith and fair dealings:
Under the general obligation of good faith, [a merchant] must meet the test
of "honesty in fact." That is one standard. Because he is a merchant, he must
observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." This
is a second standard. And because the applicable section specifically requires
it, he must act "in good faith and within limits set by commercial reasonable-
ness." And this is a third standard.
68
Other conceptions of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealings point to similar inquiries regarding not merely the rights speci-
fied by the express terms of a contract but the exercise of those rights. In
fact, Professor Robert Summers has classified bad faith performance of
contract into six general areas (which are not exhaustive) that look be-
yond the mere letter of the contract: (1) evasion of the spirit of the deal;
(2) lack of diligence and slacking off; (3) willful rendering of only sub-
stantial performance; (4) abuse of a power to specify terms; (5) abuse of a
power to determine compliance; and (6) interference with, or failure to
cooperate in, the other party's performance.69
Courts have used this analysis to require that the exercise of discre-
tionary powers be reasonable and in the spirit of the transaction. For ex-
ample, in B.P. G. Autoland Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp. ,70 the
court held that a creditor's lenient course of dealing throughout its rela-
tionship with the debtor made its abrupt termination of financing for the
debtor a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings.' The
court noted that "[d]espite the mechanical provisions of an agreement,
the actual historical relationship between a borrower and lender may al-
ter a lender's obligations when it attempts to enforce those provisions at
a later time." Specifically, if a lender initially displays leniency towards a
borrower in the administration of a loan agreement, "'it may later violate
the good faith obligation if it suddenly changes its previously lenient
course of dealing.' 73 Similarly, courts have held that, if discretion is
vested completely in one party to a contract, the covenant of good faith
and fair dealings requires that "a party vested with contractual discretion
68. E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 666, 676 (1963) (discussing merchant re-
quirements of good faith and fair dealing under the U.C.C.).
69. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195,232-43 (1968).
70. 785 F. Supp. 222 (D. Mass. 1991).
71. See id at 229.
72- Id at 228.
73. Id (quoting K.J. Goldberg, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REV. 653, 659
(1988), and Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288,292 (Alaska 1983)).
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must exercise that discretion reasonably and with proper motive, and
may not do so arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with
the reasonable expectations of the parties., 74 Consequently, for example,
if a contract's completion is dependent on one party's certification of a
computer system that is arbitrarily withheld (even though it is within that
party's discretion to do so), the covenant of good faith and fair dealings
could be violated. Similarly, if the contractual obligation of one party
was contingent on a condition "peculiarly within the power of that party,
such as obtaining mortgage financing or obtaining necessary licenses or
permits,, 76 the controlling party's discretion to create that condition is
limited by the covenant of good faith and fair dealings; the covenant re-
quires the controlling party to use reasonable efforts to bring about that
condition.7 Thus, courts applying the covenant of good faith and fair
dealings have examined conduct outside of the express terms of the con-
tract to determine restrictions on the exercise of discretion in performing
or enforcing written contract terms.
In the context of bankruptcy, the Sixth Circuit in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co.,78 held that the failure of a creditor, on whose financing a
debtor was wholly dependent, to give reasonable notice of a decision to
refuse further funds was a violation of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealings. 9
The record clearly established that a medium-sized company in the wholesale
grocery business, such as [the debtor], could not operate without outside fi-
nancing. Thus, the literal interpretation of the financing agreement urged
upon us by [the creditor] ... would leave [the debtor's] continued existence
entirely at the whim or mercy of [the creditor], absent an obligation of good
faith performance.
80
In evaluating the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings, the
Sixth Circuit looked beyond the terms of the contract. In determining the
equities of the situation, the court considered the actual effect of the ac-
tion on the parties involved and their past performance.
74. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 972 (Ill. App. 1984).
75. See Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d 1388 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that refusal to
provide certification for computer system presented question of violation of covenant of good
faith and fair dealings for jury to decide).
76. Dayan, 466 N.E.2d at 972.
77. See id. (collecting Illinois cases regarding mortgage and licensing approvals); see also
BA Mortgage & Int'l Realty Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 706 F.
Supp. 1364 (N.D. II1. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs adequately stated claim for breach of good
faith and fair dealings by alleging that lending contract had vested approval power in mortgage
lender to be exercised in sole discretion and that discretion was exercised arbitrarily and capri-
ciously and for benefit of lender's other interests).
78. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).




Of course, modem contract law recognizes the importance and domi-
nance of express terms in interpreting contracts. Express terms are gen-
erally given significant weight in interpreting agreements.8' Some courts
have also recognized limitations on the ability of a course of dealings or
the covenant of good faith and fair dealings to override express contract
terms or impose additional obligations. 2 Significantly, courts have held
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings not to create benefits
not bargained for in the original agreement. s3 They have suggested that
"[t]he covenant is breached only when one party to a contract seeks to
prevent its performance by, or to withhold its benefits from, the other.
The mere exercise of one's contractual rights, without more, cannot con-
stitute such a breach." However, modem contract law's recognition of
the importance of express contract terms does not extend to the limits of
the formalist contract-rights presumption. Although the covenant of
good faith and fair dealings and the recognition of relational contract
principles cannot override or add to express contract terms, they do gov-
ern the interpretation and performance of those contract terms, and they
do generate a legally recognized context in which the parties' adherence
to the contract or enforcement of its express terms must be evaluated.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealings governs the enforcement of
express contract terms, and relational contract principles and the course
of dealing help explain the interpretation of those terms. As a result, to
evaluate the nature of the contract and whether the rights it secures are
being exercised in good faith, courts continue to engage in inquiries re-
garding the nature of the benefits bargained for in transactions and the
performance and intent of the parties engaged in them. These inquiries
range beyond merely determining whether a course of conduct is within
the rights expressed in a written contract.8s
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 203(b) (1981) (giving express terms
greatest weight in interpreting agreements).
82. See, e.g., Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 361 (Wash. 1991) ("[A] course of
dealing does not override express terms in a contract or add additional obligations.").
83. See, e.g., Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. E-II Holdings, Inc., 926 F.2d 636 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding that implied covenant did not require disclosure of information supporting man-
agement evaluation of bonds in addition to opinions required in bond covenants); Geren v.
Quantum Chemical Corp., 832 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealings did not prevent firm from incurring substantial additional debt to
pay special dividend to shareholders); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings did
not include negative covenant preventing bond issuer from incurring massive LBO debt that
decreased value of bonds).
84. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l, 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying New York law)
(citation omitted).
85. See, e.g., B.P.G. Autoland Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 785 F. Supp. 222,
228 (D. Mass. 1991) ("[W]hen the lender initially displays leniency toward the borrower in its
administration of the loan agreement, it may later violate the good faith obligation if it suddenly
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2. Inconsistent Conceptions of Contract Rights
The formalist contract-rights presumption is thus fundamentally in-
consistent with an important part of modem contract law. Instead of
evaluating the non-written relationship between contracting parties to
determine the extent and content of contract rights,86 courts using the
presumption limit their inquiry to the written terms of the contract
aloneY Instead of examining the performance and exercise of contract
rights under the standard of good faith and fair dealings,n those courts
simply inquire whether conduct is in literal compliance with contract
terms.89
This inconsistency with modem contract law is important for several
reasons. First, if the formalist contract-rights presumption is inconsistent
with modem contract law, it loses its primary source of express legal justi-
fication. Courts justify shielding creditor conduct under the formalist con-
tract-rights presumption because such conduct is in accordance with con-
tract rights and thus is protected under contract law.9° Contract law, they
argue, presents a standard for acceptable conduct and a source of justifi-
cation for creditors' taking certain actions. If the courts' conception of
contract law is incorrect, and a creditor's conduct is not in accordance
with contract rights as recognized by modem contract law, then the ex-
plicit, legal justification for shielding the creditor's inequitable behavior is
a fiction. Contract law neither lends protection to nor justifies the protec-
tion of such conduct. If the creditor's conduct were being evaluated out-
side of the bankruptcy context, it would not be justifiable under modem
contract law. As a matter of modem contract law, what the parties
agreed to and what they can reasonably expect is determined by a fact-
based relational evaluation, not by mere reference to the written terms of
an agreement.91
Courts might find some independent reason to justify privileging or
changes its previously lenient course of dealing." (citations omitted)); BA Mortgage & Int'l Re-
alty Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 706 F. Supp. 1364, 1373 (1989)
(holding that good faith between contracting parties requires that party vested with contractual
discretion exercise it reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously); Bennett v. Genoa Ag. Cen-
ter, Inc. (In re Bennett), 154 B.R. 140,148 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that shift from leni-
ent pattern of treatment of debtor by creditor to unreasonable refusal constituted breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealings).
86. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
87. See supra Part II.
88. See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
89. See supra Part II.
90. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting (Kham 11), 908 F.2d 1351,
1356-58 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. (Clark Pipe 11), 893 F.2d 693, 699-701
(5th Cir. 1990).
91. See supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text.
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shielding such behavior,9 but they cannot and should not protect it on
the basis of or with reference to contract law or contract rights, as they
currently do under the formalist contract-rights presumption. If courts
wish to justify using the formalist contract-rights presumption with refer-
ence to modem contract law, they must first transform modem contract
law to return it to a formalist conception.93 Because courts do justify and
calibrate the formalist presumption with reference to contract law, they
should do so correctly and consistently.
There are functional reasons for aligning the presumption more
closely with actual contract law doctrine. First, if the formalist contract-
fights presumption is inconsistent with modem contract law, then its ap-
plication undermines a fundamental principle of equitable subordination:
equality of distribution.94 Courts equitably subordinate creditor claims in
order to place creditors in the correct equitable position of priority for
distribution, treating like creditors alike.95 Thus, unlike ordinary contract
law, which focuses solely on the behavior of the parties to the contract
vis-d-vis each other, equitable subordination is concerned with the rela-
tionship of a creditor to both the debtor and to the debtor's other credi-
tors.96 Applying the formalist contract-rights presumption, however, a
court could treat legally unequal creditors equally and legally equal credi-
tors unequally. The presumption shields equally both the creditor who
behaves according to relational principles of modem contract law and the
creditor who violates modem contract law but stays within the written
contract terms. Some parties who abide by their contracts and other par-
ties who breach their contracts are treated equally. At the same time,
modern-contract-law-breakers who stay within the written terms of their
contracts are treated differently than are those creditors whose acts are
equally wrongful under the modem contracts regime but are, addition-
ally, in violation of the written terms of their contracts. Although a court
applying the presumption treats equally those creditors who have vio-
lated the contract's express terms and also treats equally those creditors
who have not done so, this policy is not in any equitable sense the equal
92. See infra Sections IV.B -C.
93. One interpretation of the Seventh Circuit's move in Kham II is that Judge Easterbrook
was attempting to do just that-to reestablish a formalist notion of contract and curtail the in-
terpretation of good faith and fair dealings. See Dennis M. Patterson, Essay, A Fable from the
Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REv. 503, 526-32 (1991). Al-
though this move towards a more formalist view of contract law can be debated at length be-
yond the limits of this paper, it should be recognized that this formalist characterization is a
strongly contested one that is at odds with the more robust interpretation of good faith and fair
dealings in specific-and contract law in general-that is recognized by a significant number of
courts and jurisdictions. See supra Subsection II.A.1.
94. See In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. (Clark Pipe 1), 870 F.2d 1022,1031 (5th Cir. 1989).
95. See id.
96. See iL; In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791,804 (8th Cir. 1944).
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treatment of similarly situated creditors if the formalist presumption is
not consistent with modern contract law.
This inconsistency generates perverse incentives for creditor conduct.
Different standards of conduct in contract and equitable subordination
law could create confusion or strategic creditor behavior when a debtor is
close to bankruptcy.9 For example, a group of creditors might be bound
under relational contract law to provide a debtor with notice before at-
tempting to seize its assets without being obligated to do so under the
terms of their written agreements with the debtor. The closer the debtor
were to bankruptcy, the stronger would be each creditor's incentive to
seize those assets without notice pursuant to the formal written terms of
the contract. Each creditor would try to predict the others' behavior and
to foreclose prematurely in order to maximize its own interests at the
other creditors' expense.98
Finally, the inconsistency between the presumption and modem con-
tract law might allow conduct that would constitute a breach of modem
contract law, such as insufficient performance, arbitrary action, and gen-
erally bad faith activities, to escape the sanction of equitable subordina-
tion merely because it is within express contract terms. Although ordi-
nary contract law could be used to police these problems pre-
bankruptcy-for example, by providing damages for breach or rescinding
the contract -by the time a court is examining creditor conduct to de-
termine whether to exercise the power of equitable subordination, such
remedies may be too little too late: Awarding damages for contract
breach to the debtor from the creditor may not reestablish the correct
equitable relationship of priority between the creditor and other credi-
tors that is one goal of equitable subordination.'O" Furthermore, rescind-
97. Cf. Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Intentions and an Irresolute Endorsement for Scientific Ra-
tionalism: Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1439, 1450 (discussing
bankruptcy preference law's objective of preventing creditors from unnecessarily pushing trou-
bled debtor into bankruptcy).
98. Inter-creditor conflict and strategic behavior appears to be widespread in bankruptcy
and makes such a scenario not unlikely. See Robert M. Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Profes-
sional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Business Liquidations, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1207,
1230-31 (1997) (reporting that inter-creditor conflict constituted a significant factor in generat-
ing bankruptcy costs). Specifically, creditors have historically behaved strategically with regard
to debtors under the formalist presumption model. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First
Bank of Whiting (Kham 1), 908 F.2d 1351, 1353-54 (7th Cir. 1990) (reporting bank's opportun-
istic moves close in time to bankruptcy); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 762 (6th
Cir. 1985) (reporting creditor's lack of notice to debtor as part of creditor's "game plan" close in
time to bankruptcy).
99. See Blue v. Shoen, 556 So. 2d 1364, 1369 (La. App. 1990) (holding that remedy for bad-
faith sale is rescission); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-176 (1981) (discussing
rescinding contracts for duress or threat).
100. See Kansas City, 144 F.2d at 804 (discussing equality of distribution). Again, equitable
subordination is oriented not merely at reestablishing the correct debtor-creditor relationship
but also at establishing the correct inter-creditor relationships in priority of distribution as well.
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ing a contract or awarding damages under contract law is limited to the
contract that is breached.0 1 In contrast, courts finding inequitable and
harmful conduct in any aspect of the creditor-debtor relationship can re-
arrange the priority of payments to reset overall equities in a much more
fundamental way.'0 Leaving the policing of these abuses to contract law
alone would subvert the comprehensive regulatory objectives underlying
the power of equitable subordination.
B. Conflict with Bankruptcy Preference Law
Like modem contract law, bankruptcy preference law involves a fact-
based inquiry into the course of dealings between the parties. Specifi-
cally, in interpreting the ordinary business exception of section 547(c)(2)
to the bankruptcy trustee's "preference avoidance" power under section
547(b), courts must go beyond examining the express terms of a contract
by evaluating the relationships and course of dealings between the credi-
tor and the debtor.
1. The Relational Inquiry of the Ordinary Business Exception
Because of the suspicion that transfers made close in time to the filing
of bankruptcy could have contributed to a debtor's decline and might be
the result of radically skewed bargaining power situations, section 547(b)
of the Code gives a trustee in bankruptcy the power to "avoid" such
transfers.' 3 Essentially, a trustee can cancel and reverse any suspicious-
looking transfers (called "avoidable preferences") that occur close in
time to the filing of bankruptcy. Using this power, the trustee, with the
court's approval, can require the creditor to return transfers to the bank-
ruptcy estate where they will be redistributed according to priority as de-
termined in bankruptcy.'O'
See id.
101. See Blue, 556 So. 2d at 1369; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-176
(1981) (discussing rescinding contracts).
102. See Kansas City, 144 F.2d at 804 (explaining that inequitable activity need not be di-
rectly related to claims being subordinated).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1991).
104. Under § 547(b),
a trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property (1) to or for
the benefit of a creditor, (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor before such transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4)
made-(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B) be-
tween ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5) that enables such creditor
to receive more than such creditor would receive if-(A) the case were a case under
chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been made; and (C) such creditor re-
ceived payment of such debt to the extent provided by provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
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When a creditor challenges the trustee's avoidance of a transfer,
courts must engage in a fact-based, relational inquiry to evaluate whether
the transfer was made in the ordinary course of business between the
creditor and the debtor. Under section 547(c)(2), a trustee cannot avoid a
transfer: "(2) to the extent that such transfer was-(A) in payment of a
debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or finan-
cial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; (B) made in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
and (C) made according to ordinary business terms."' ' In applying the
ordinary business exception of section 547(c)(2)(B), courts have fre-
quently considered factors beyond the mere exercise of contract rights.
They have looked to subjective understandings of the course of dealings
between the debtor and creditor in these relationships and, in some juris-
dictions, to the objective course of dealings of similarly situated parties in
the debtor's and creditor's respective industries."6
First, under section 547(c)(2), courts have engaged in a fact-based
analysis to uphold transfers that are in breach of the express terms of a
contract. In a series of cases, for example, courts have upheld debtors'
late payments that violate the express payment terms of the contract as
valid within the ordinary business exception because they fit into the pat-
tern of past dealings between the creditor and the debtoric7
In addition, courts have engaged in a fact-based analysis to determine
that a creditor's exercise of clearly delineated contract rights was not in
the ordinary course of business and thus subject to the avoiding power.
For example, in the case of In re Southern Industrial Banking Corpora-
tion,'°8 the court held that although an investor's withdrawal of money
from his account with the debtor was in strict compliance with the ex-
press terms of his deposit agreement, the transfer could still be avoided
as preferential.'O The court reasoned that regardless of the investor's ex-
press rights to make his withdrawal, the fact that the debtor was in the
course of a "run" meant that it was not operating in the ordinary course
105. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1991).
106. See Ponoroff, supra note 97, at 1452-70 (explaining tests).
107. See, e.g., In re Tennessee Chemical Co., 112 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that late
payments between debtor chemical company and creditor gas company were not avoidable be-
cause they fell within in ordinary course of business exception due to long history of consistently
late payments); Windsor Communications Group v. Freedom Greeting Card Co., 63 B.R. 770
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that return of unsold greeting cards to supplier in return for credit was
made according to "ordinary business terms" because it was consistent with prior dealings and
therefore could not be avoided as preferential); In re Bee Furniture Co., 206 B.R. 989 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that late payments to advertising creditor were not avoidable because
they were consistent with pattern of prior course of dealing between parties and were thus in
ordinary course of business).
108. 189 B.R. 697 (E.D. Tenn. 1992).
109. See id at 704.
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of business. The court could therefore not allow the transfer under the
ordinary course of business exception."' The court went beyond a simple
examination of express contract rights and evaluated the situation sur-
rounding the debtor, the creditor, and the transfer itself.
In fact, courts have even used fact-based analysis to determine that
bringing a series of transfers into closer compliance with express contract
terms can actually bring them outside of the ordinary course of business
and thus render them avoidable by the trustee. In In re Miniscribe
Corp.,I the court engaged in a fact-based analysis of a series of payments
made between a debtor and creditor shortly before bankruptcy. As in
Clark Pipe I, the court first explored the contract between the two par-
ties. The court found that the debtor had expressly agreed to pay a key
supplier/creditor within 30 days of receiving critical supplies. 12 The court
then examined the course of dealings between the parties and deter-
mined that the debtor had run into financial trouble and stretched out
payments to the supplier and other creditors beyond the express payment
terms."' The court's inquiry further revealed that, in the 90-day period
prior to bankruptcy, the creditor used its position as a key supplier to en-
sure that it received payments on outstanding invoices and began to en-
force the express terms of payment.14 Looking over the entire course of
dealing between debtor and creditor, the court determined that the much
more erratic payment schedule of the earlier relationship suddenly be-
came more regular and matched contract terms in the period preceding
bankruptcy.1 As a result, the court concluded that the contractual pay-
ments did not fall within the ordinary business exception.16 The court
thus looked beyond the express terms of the written contract to deter-
mine that the transfers were subject to the trustee's avoiding power.
Bankruptcy precedents uniformly indicate that, under the ordinary
business exception in bankruptcy preference law, courts must look be-
yond the express contract terms to determine whether transfers should
be subject to the trustee's avoiding power. Just as in modem contract
law, courts in bankruptcy preference law give weight to the relationship
between parties over time. Bankruptcy preference law thus appears to
110. See id
111. 123 B.R. 86 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
112. See id. at 88.
113. See id
114. See id. at 89.
115. See id
116. See id
117. The court cited other cases, such as J.P. Frye, Inc. of Florida v. Bradco Supply Corp.,
891 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1989), and In re Bob Grisset Golf Shoppes, Inc., 78 B.R. 787 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1987), where attempts to shift to prompt payment in accordance with negotiated terms led
to the avoidance of those transfers.
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recognize the same norms of relational contract and good faith and fair
dealings that are central to modem contract law.
118
2. Inconsistent Approaches to Evaluating Conduct
The formalist contract-rights presumption is thus inconsistent with
underpinnings of bankruptcy preference law. Instead of examining the
course of dealings between creditors and debtors to determine whether
conduct is within the ordinary course of business, courts applying the
formalist presumption limit their inquiry to the written terms of the con-
tract.
This inconsistency is troubling for at least two reasons. First, courts
have held that one of the requirements of equitable subordination is that
its exercise must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code."9 If the formalist presumption establishes a standard for
creditor conduct that is inconsistent with other areas of the bankruptcy
law, equitable subordination under this presumption may be more likely
to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Code and thus invalid or
unjustified.
Second, this inconsistency creates conflicting and confusing incentives
for creditor behavior. On the one hand, the presumption will shield from
equitable subordination some behavior that is outside of the ordinary
course of business but within the written terms of the contract.'2° On the
other hand, the presumption will not shield behavior that is consistent
with a long history of ordinary business dealings but that is not in accor-
dance with strict contract terms.1 Thus, creditors will face conflicting in-
centives from equitable subordination and bankruptcy preference law.
The protection of the presumption will encourage them to enforce their
written contract terms to the fullest, while the ordinary business excep-
tion will discourage them from doing so outside of the course of past
dealings. This combination of conflicting incentives and treatments will
only produce confusion, inconsistent behavior, and strategic behavior by
creditors when debtors appear on the brink of bankruptcy.
118. See supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text.
119. See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692,700 (5th Cir. 1977).
120. For example, the creditor behavior in Miniscribe would probably be protected from
equitable subordination by the formalist contract rights presumption, because, although the be-
havior was held to create an invalid preference, it was within the written terms of the contract.
See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
121. For example, the consistently late payments of debtors to creditors that the courts
ruled as valid within the ordinary course of business, see supra note 107 and accompanying text,
would probably not be protected by the presumption.
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IV. THE CASE FOR A VIABLE STANDARD
Concerns about inconsistency aside, the formalist contract-rights pre-
sumption should be rejected first and foremost because it subverts the
very purpose of equitable subordination by establishing an inflexible,
unjustified, and inaccurate standard for evaluating the equities of creditor
conduct. This Part argues that the purposes of equitable subordination
are undermined by the enforcement of the formalist presumption. Fur-
thermore, it argues that instead of increasing efficiency and fairness, the
presumption decreases them. This Part concludes by proposing an alter-
native to the formalist contract-rights presumption that meets these con-
cerns.
A. Precision of Remedy
The formalist contract-rights presumption should be rejected because it
attempts to establish an inflexible and inaccurate legal restriction on what
was intended to be a flexible and narrowly focused equity power of last re-
sort. First, as was noted above, in the early development of the power of
equitable subordination, the Supreme Court established that this equitable
remedy should be used flexibly in the defense of substantive and equitable
justice against the legal machinations of inequitable actors.tm Equitable
subordination must be used flexibly "to prevent the consummation of a
course of conduct by [a] claimant which... would be fraudulent or other-
wise inequitable."1 As the Court stated in Pepper v. Litton: "[E]quity will
undo the wrong or intervene to prevent its consummation."12'
To accomplish these equitable ends, courts exercising the power of
equitable subordination have been directed to analyze closely the actual
behavior of the actors involved and not merely to examine their per-
formance under the technical or mechanical boundaries of law and con-
tract. In fact, the Supreme Court charged the bankruptcy courts with the
specific duty to "sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that
injustice or unfairness is not done in the administration of the estate.""
The breadth of this analysis under the power of equitable subordination
is expansive., Courts have been directed to examine any conduct of the
claimant that affects the bankruptcy results when deciding whether to
apply equitable subordination:
The inequity which will entitle a bankruptcy court to regulate the distribution
to a creditor, by subordination or other equitable means, need not therefore
122. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
123. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726,733 (1946).
124. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,311 (1939).
125. Id. at 310.
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be specifically related to the creditor's claim, either in its origin or in its ac-
quisition, but it may equally arise out of any unfair act on the part of the
creditor, which affects the bankruptcy results to other creditors and so makes
it inequitable that he should assert a parity with them in the distribution of
the estate ....126
Thus, bankruptcy courts in general must undertake a fact-intensive
analysis to ensure equality of distribution and equity.
Equitable subordination in particular requires a careful and close
analysis because it strikes at the heart of the purpose of bankruptcy; it is
the Code's safety valve on creditor conduct and fairness of distribution.
The court in In re Teltronics Services, Inc. stated:
The remedy of equitable subordination must remain sufficiently flexible to
deal with manifest injustice resulting from the violation of the rules of fair
play.... "[w]here ingenuity spawns unprecedented vagaries of unfairness,
[the bankruptcy courts] should not decline to recognize their marks, nor hesi-
tate to turn the twilight for [the offending claimant] into a new dawn for
other creditors."
1 Z
This need for flexibility in the power of equitable subordination has
been generally demonstrated by the Supreme Court's approval of the use
of the power to alter the priority of tax penalties in recent cases regarding
the priority of creditors in bankruptcy26 and specifically demonstrated by
the traditional use of the power ( before the ascendancy of the formalist
presumption) to examine the terms of a contract in bankruptcy to deter-
mine if the creditor was inequitably controlling.
1 29
Accordingly, equitable subordination should reject the rigid, formalis-
tic, bright-line rule of the formalist contract-rights presumption because it
is and must remain the most flexible mechanism that the Code provides
for the policing of inequitable but ill-defined behavior. Although some
limits and guidelines on the exercise of the power of equitable subordina-
tion are justified and should be given to guide courts in their application
of this potent and far-reaching equity power, these rules should be flexi-
ble, justified and consistent with other areas of the law. Specifically, the
limits or guidelines should not provide some creditors with the incentive
or opportunity, as the formalist presumption would, to avoid the court's
equity powers by behaving within express contract terms.13° The guide-
126. In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791,804 (8th Cir. 1944).
127. 29 B.R. 139, 172 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted).
128. See Browning, supra note 13, at 504-21 (1993); Christou, supra note 13, at 246-47.
129. See Fruehauf Corp. v. T.E. Mercer Trucking Co. (In re T.E. Mercer Trucking Co.), 16
B.R. 176 (1981) (holding that courts will examine not only conduct of nonmanagement creditor
to determine whether it breached contract but control provisions and exercise of control in con-
tract itself to determine whether it was inequitably controlling); Banque Indosuez v. Rush
Farms, 1996 WL 307120 (Ark. App. 1996) (examining contract terms in equitable subordination
case to evaluate level of control).
130. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
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lines should also not establish inaccurate or inconsistent boundaries as
the presumption appears to do.
Some courts have implicitly argued that the special and powerful na-
ture of equitable subordination requires that the standard for establishing
inequitable conduct be different from and perhaps more rigorous than
the standard for establishing impermissible behavior under modem con-
tract or bankruptcy preference law. This argument has been implicitly
advanced by some courts when applying the formalist presumption. The
Paollela court, for example, stated that "[the degree of misconduct re-
quired for equitable subordination] has been variously described as 'very
substantial' misconduct involving 'moral turpitude or some breach of duty
or some misrepresentation whereby other creditors were deceived to their
damage' or as gross misconduct amounting to fraud, overreaching or spo-
liation."'' Other courts have similarly noted the dramatic impact of equita-
ble subordination and suggested that its use be limited.32 All of these con-
siderations suggest that a different kind of standard for inequitable conduct
might be justified.
Although equitable subordination may warrant a different or higher
standard for inequitable conduct, the formalist contract-rights presumption
should be substantially recharacterized or rejected for several important
reasons. First, the formalist contract-rights presumption misstates the mod-
em law of contract rights and is unjustified. If the courts wish to continue to
protect creditor conduct within the express terms of a written contract, they
should at a minimum recharacterize that conduct and explicitly justify pro-
tecting it on grounds other than contract law. The courts' failure to do so
has ignored or mischaracterized modem contract law by ignoring the rights
recognized by the relational model of contract and good faith and fair
dealings.'33 Furthermore, using contract terminology presents a disingenu-
ous justification for protecting this kind of conduct; it is not within the lim-
its of modem contract law."T If equitable subordination is such a special
and powerful remedy, the mechanism for deciding when to apply it should
be both correctly stated and carefully justified. In its current formulation,
the formalist contract-rights presumption is neither.
Second, the formalist contract-rights presumption should be rejected
because it is inaccurate. If equitable subordination is such an extraordinary
power, its application should be as precise as possible.'35 Simply inquiring
131. Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 119
(E.D. Pa. 1993).
132. See, e.g., In re 80 Nassau Assoc., 169 B.R. 832, 837 (1994) (discussing requirement of
inequitable conduct).
133. See supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text.
134. See id.
135. See Paollela, 161 B.R. at 119 (explaining importance of equitable subordination).
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into the express terms of a written contract under the formalist contract-
fights presumption ignores significant, variations in a creditor's conduct. A
full inquiry into the nature of a creditor's conduct vis-d-vis a debtor and an
application of a consistent and high standard for inequitable conduct would
take advantage of the tests and standards developed in modem contact and
bankruptcy preference law to assess more accurately the nature of creditor
conduct. Such an inquiry would allow courts to place inequitable conduct
on a constant scale of behavior along with good faith performance and
conduct within the ordinary course of business.
If courts simply want to apply a higher standard for inequitable con-
duct, then they could do so by engaging in a fact-based analysis of the rela-
tionship between the parties and thereafter applying to it an explicitly
higher standard for inequitable conduct. By applying a consistent method
of evaluation in equitable subordination, modem contract law, and bank-
ruptcy preference law, the courts can make an accurate evaluation of credi-
tors' conduct without lowering the level of misconduct required to trigger
equitable subordination.
The formalist contract-rights presumption should be rejected because it
is too inflexible as a standard for applying equitable subordination. It
privileges form over substance in direct opposition to the objectives of eq-
uitable subordination and offers to the remedy neither a more principled
justification nor improved precision.
B. Efficiency
Although courts and commentators have made two efficiency-based
arguments in favor of a formalist contract-rights model, the presumption
in reality fails to support either and, in fact, may generate greater ineffi-
ciencies instead.
1. Freedom and Certainty of Contract
First, advocates argue that a formalist model of express contract
rights would promote overall efficiency in the market by ensuring both
freedom and certainty of contract.136 They argue that without a formalist
136. See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting (Kham 11), 908
F.2d 1351, 1356-57 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing efficiency enhancements of formalist contract
model); DENNIS PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY: TOWARD A UNIFIED
THEORY (1990) (arguing that good faith can interfere with market efficiency when it is applied
to lender liability); Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131
(1989) (discussing the efficiency of formalist contract in the lender liability context); Corey R.
Chivers, Note, "Contracting Around" the Good Faith Covenant To Avoid Lender Liability, 1991
COLUM Bus. L. REv. 359, 374-75 (arguing that using the good faith doctrine to "override" con-
tract terms increases all future borrowers' costs of inflexibility because lenders cannot negotiate
different terms); Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good Faith?: The Good
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contract-rights model, courts will apply fact-based analysis and concepts
of good faith to "override" contract terms and misallocate the fruits of
efficient, pre-agreed bargains.3 7 Furthermore, courts will apply such fact-
based, relational analysis inconsistently, generating uncertainty in the
marketplace and increasing overall transaction costs."8 Thus, its advo-
cates argue, a formalist contract-rights model will promote efficiency by
ensuring both that parties will be free to make and enforce an efficient
contract and that they will be certain about their rights under that con-
tract.
Unfortunately, these arguments make four invalid assumptions about
the actual nature of creditor-debtor contracts and the place of a formalist
contract-rights model in equitable subordination. First, the formalist con-
tract-rights model assumes that the written contract represents the entire
content of the parties' actual agreement and that such an agreement is
certain. Empirical studies of debtors and creditors in lender-liability
situations, however, suggest that the written terms of the contract are of-
ten ignored, used in a way that does not reflect their literal meaning, or
are superseded by oral representations or subsequent behavior."9 Fur-
thermore, modem contract law and bankruptcy preference law both rec-
ognize that the course of dealings and of performance between two par-
ties can more precisely reflect and shape the nature of their agreement.'
Finally, even if parties did want the express terms of their contract to re-
flect the entire agreement with certainty, they could ensure that their ex-
press rights were maintained by behaving consistently with the written
agreement or taking other precautions. 4' Consequently, rejecting the
formalist contract-rights presumption would not necessarily cause courts
Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1360-64 (1988)
(arguing that courts that reinterpret contracts with respect to good faith principles increase costs
by misallocating burdens and benefits already efficiently negotiated by the parties); William E.
Deitrick & Jeffrey C.B. Levine, Contractual Good Faith: Let the Contract, Not the Courts, De-
fine the Bargain, 85 ILL. B.J. 120, 122 (1997) (arguing that courts inconsistently apply good faith
and fair dealings analysis with subjective and thus biased perspectives to commercial contracts,
increasing costs).
137. See Chivers, supra note 136, at 374-75.
138. See, e.g., Snyderman, supra note 136, at 1360-64; Deitrick & Levine, supra note 136, at
122.
139. See Barbara A. Fure, Contracts as Literature: A Hermeneutic Approach to the Implied
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Loan Agreements, 31 DUQUESNE L. REV.
729, 753 (1993) ("Instead, many times, the written terms [of a lending contract] are ignored or
are used in a way that does not reflect their literal, plain meaning.... Many times, the borrower
is led to believe that the terms used are just a formality.").
140. See supra notes 63-85,103-118 and accompanying text.
141. Cf. Steven H. Hilfinger, Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary Financing
and the Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 539, 569-88 (1987) (suggesting creditor
strategies for ensuring certainty in the good faith interpretation of their loan documents); Cary
Smith, Note, Breach of Good Faith as an Expansive Basis for Lender Liability Claims: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come-and Gone?, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 177,199-203 (1989) (same).
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to rewrite contracts or interpret them inconsistently.
Second, efficiency arguments in favor of a formalist contract model
assume a broader shift toward formalism. Until this hypothetical shift
manifested itself, however, creditors would have to behave according to a
relational contract model under ordinary contract law and bankruptcy
preference law,42 and any gains in certainty generated by a shift to the
formalist contract-rights presumption in the law of equitable subordina-
tion would be limited.1 43 Indeed, shifting to a formalist model in equitable
subordination alone could generate greater uncertainty and inefficiency
as a result of its inconsistency with the rest of contract and bankruptcy
law. 1
44
Third, the formalist contract-rights model assumes a formalist concep-
tion of freedom and certainty of contract. Formalist contract advocates
assume that agreements are intended to be fixed at the time of writing:
Freedom of contract to these advocates means freedom to choose fixed
terms at a single moment in time,14' and certainty of contract means fixing
the meaning at that moment.46 In contrast, modem contract law ensures
parties the freedom to adapt and interpret their contracts over time with
recognition by both sides.'47 Modem contract law also ensures certainty
by upholding the expectations of parties generated by a course of deal-
ings over time.148 Furthermore, if parties to a contract want to ensure that
their original writing governs the interpretation of their contract, they
can do so under a relational model of contract by behaving consistently
with the express terms of the contract over time.149 Modem conceptions
of relational contract, it can thus be argued, better secure freedom and
certainty of contract.
Finally, a formalist contract model ignores the expectations of other
creditors, which are a central concern in bankruptcy. A relational con-
tract model, on the other hand, might increase efficiency of transactions
142. See supra notes 63-85, 103-118 and accompanying text.
143. It is also unclear whether lenders and borrowers contracting in a world of ordinary
commercial contract will be affected by the potential for equitable subordination in their mak-
ing of contracts or normal execution of them. See G. Eric Brunstad, Bankruptcy and the Con-
flicts of Debt 11 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that bankruptcy
law should be understood as dealing with distinctive problems of economic futility, which differ
dramatically from problems arising during ordinary business operations of debtors).
144. See supra notes 86-102,119-121 and accompanying text. Although courts could use the
formalist contract rights presumption in bankruptcy to initiate such a larger change, other con-
siderations about the role and nature of equitable subordination itself suggest that this is exactly
the wrong place to establish a formal legal barrier to evaluating the equities of actual, relational
conduct. A discussion of these considerations, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
145. See, e.g., Deitrick & Levine, supra note 136, at 122.
146. See id.
147. See supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text.
148. See id.
149. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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by protecting reliable behavior for other creditors. Because a creditor's
behavior and financial position may be directly affected by that of other
creditors," ° creditors want reliable information about the rights and ex-
pectations of other creditors, particularly when a debtor is close to bank-
ruptcy."' A relational model of contract would privilege the observable
course of dealings between the creditor and the debtor and uphold third-
party creditor expectations based on that course of dealings.52 In contrast
to the formalist model, by generating greater observable certainty, the
relational model increases efficiency both for first and for third parties.
Thus, the formalist contract-rights presumption is unlikely to increase
efficiency by ensuring freedom or certainty of contract and may very well
decrease it.
2. Costs of Litigation
Advocates of the formalist contract-rights presumption also argue
that it reduces the costs of litigation (and thus litigation insurance) be-
cause bright-line rules are less disputable than fact-intensive standards.'53
By reducing these costs, they contend, the formalist contract-rights pre-
sumption would reduce the overall costs of lending in the market.
Three observations significantly undermine the argument that the
formalist presumption will decrease litigation costs. First, there is no em-
pirical evidence of any significant savings from a formalist rule. Commen-
tators on the contract doctrine of good faith and fair dealings have noted
that such arguments have never been empirically proven. 14 In fact, em-
150. Cf. In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791, 804 (8th Cir. 1944) (explaining
that under equitable subordination, creditor conduct is evaluated based in part on its effect on
other creditors).
151. Cf Ponoroff, supra note 97, at 1450 (explaining that the ordinary course of business
exception attempts to prevent creditors from inadvertently pushing troubled but potentially vi-
able debtors into insolvency).
152. See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting (Kham 11), 908
F.2d 1351, 1353 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that creditor's actions, and its contract's express
terms, induced other creditors to supply goods to debtor). It could be argued that a shift to a
strictly formalist contract rights presumption would cause creditors to pay greater attention to
the express terms of each others' agreements with the debtor. For example, creditors might re-
quest disclosure of each others' agreements to determine their formal contract rights and terms.
Creditors would then have the same kind of efficient ex ante notice of each other's potential
and protected actions. The fact, however, that most creditors and debtors empirically seem to
ignore their agreements or interpret them in ways other than would be required by the plain
meaning of their written terms, see Fure, supra note 139, at 753, suggests that this shift would
entail significant costs and might not be either practical or effective.
153. See, e.g., Kham II, 908 F.2d at 1356-57; PATrItRSON, supra note 136; Fischel, supra
note 136, at 137; Chivers, supra note 136, at 375; Snyderman, supra note 136, at 1361.
154. See Fure, supra note 139, at 751-52. Fure notes:
The reasons given by courts and commentators for applying the formalistic rules tend
to be some variation of the unfounded, unproven fear that, at worst, banks will stop
lending money if they cannot rely solely upon the written language in their agree-
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pirical studies of similar arguments demonstrate no such effect. i5 Second,
an isolated formalist rule in equitable subordination is unlikely to gener-
ate significant savings, because litigation about good faith and fair deal-
ings and the ordinary business exception could still occur.156 Third, any
possible litigation savings are likely to be limited because bankruptcy
cases are already under considerable court supervision and frequently in-
volve litigation regarding matters related to creditor conduct;157 the costs
of additional litigation are thus likely to be incremental.
Three considerations suggest that the formalist contract-rights pre-
sumption may actually increase litigation costs. First, the formalist con-
tract-rights presumption has historically protected some opportunistic
creditor behavior that propelled troubled debtors into bankruptcy.15 The
formalist presumption might thus create an incentive for such behavior,
unnecessarily pushing some potentially viable debtors into bankruptcy
with its extremely high litigation costs.'59 Second, protecting such oppor-
tunistic behavior might also generate greater intercreditor conflict, fur-
ther increasing litigation costs.W Third, inconsistency with the other stan-
dards of conduct could generate confusion and thus greater litigation
over the conduct required at different times.'
In sum, the formalist contract-rights presumption is unlikely to de-
ments, or, at best, the cost of lending money will increase to the point that marginal
borrowers will never be able to obtain a loan.... This premise has never been substan-
tiated. In fact, the evidence available from a similar premise indicates that this argu-
ment is fallacious.
la.
155. See id. at 752 (arguing that change in consumer debt law did not cause dire cost conse-
quences predicted by its opponents).
156. See supra notes 63-85, 103-118 and accompanying text.
157. See Brunstad, supra note 143, at 54-55 (detailing costs of bankruptcy filings and length
of cases).
158. See, e.g., In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. (Clark Pipe 11), 893 F.2d 693, 702 (5th Cir.
1990) (noting that creditor control hastened bankruptcy by channeling funds from trade credi-
tors); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting (Kham 11), 908 F.2d 1351, 1358
(7th Cir. 1990) (noting that bank's cutting of funds pursuant to express contract terms triggered
bankruptcy); see also supra Section III.B (discussing ordinary business exception rationale of
preventing slide into bankruptcy).
159. The costs of bankruptcy are significant and include both actual expenses and opportu-
nity costs. See, e.g., In re Mcorp Fin., Inc., 160 B.R. 941, 957-58 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (detailing direct
and opportunity costs of bankruptcy litigation); see also Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political
Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 315-18 (1993) (detailing
bankruptcy costs); Lawless & Ferris, supra note 98, at 1219-29 (discussing bankruptcy costs and
their causes in the Chapter 7 liquidation context).
160. Cf Ponoroff, supra note 97, at 1450 (arguing that the purpose of bankruptcy prefer-
ence law is to prevent opportunistic creditor behavior). Intercreditor conflict is one of the most
significant factors affecting bankruptcy litigation costs according to a recent empirical study of
Chapter 7 liquidations. See Lawless & Ferris, supra note 98, at 1230-31 (reporting that regres-
sion analysis of Chapter 7 bankruptcy costs demonstrated that level of intercreditor conflict was
one of two statistically significant factors affecting cost of bankruptcy).
161. See supra notes 86-102, 119-121 and accompanying text.
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crease litigation costs significantly and instead may generate more litiga-
tion.
C. Fairness
Although proponents of the formalist presumption also argue in favor
of it on the grounds of fairness, experience with and analysis of the pre-
sumption and its premises suggest that it may not promote fairness in the
interpretation of contracts and may, in fact, generate greater unfairness
in bankruptcy. Advocates of the formalist contract model argue that it is
unfair to one party for the courts to remake contracts that are unfavor-
able to the other party.162 A formalist contract model, they claim, protects
the parties from this unfairness by ensuring that a court interprets only
their express written agreement.
Several arguments rebut the fundamental bases of this argument.
First, the formalist contract model incorrectly assumes that the express
written contract is the parties' entire agreement.63 Empirical evidence
suggests that the parties to a commercial lending contract usually con-
sider their actual agreement to be manifested in their oral representa-
tions and course of dealings and not in the express terms of the contract
alone."' Thus, a court's enforcing only the express terms of a written
agreement would be unfair to one or both parties because it would not
reflect their perceived agreement.65
Second, the formalist contract model is not alone in its capacity to en-
force the express terms of a deal. Contract parties can ensure that a court
will enforce their written contract rights "fairly" under a relational model
of contract by behaving consistently with the express terms of the con-
tract over time and structuring their contracts carefully.166
Third, enforcing inconsistent standards of contract rights might be
even more unfair than reforming a contract. Enforcing only express con-
162. Deitrick & Levine, supra note 136, at 120-21.
163. See Fure, supra note 139, at 752.
164. See iU. at 752,756-57,764.
165. It could be argued that a shift to a strong formalist contract model would cause both
parties to focus on and understand the express contract terms as the nature of their deal. How-
ever, the fact that most parties currently do not appear to believe that this is the case, see id.,
suggests that causing this shift in behavior would entail substantial costs and might not be effec-
tive. Empirically, people have not believed written contract terms to memorialize their entire
agreements. See id.
166. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. In this way, both the outcomes of the ex-
isting model of behavior and the stricter formalist model can be attained. Those creditors who
plan to exercise their contract terms to the letter can inform their debtors that they plan to do so
and behave consistently, secure in the knowledge that they will be protected from equitable
subordination. The remaining population, which appears at present to believe in the binding
force of relational terms, see Fure, supra note 139, at 753, can behave relationally and have their
conduct protected.
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tract rights in equitable subordination law and not in modern contract
law or bankruptcy preference law would not enable contract parties to
establish their contracts with certainty. Contract parties can rely on
courts to uphold their agreements as established in their course of deal-
ings with each other under modem contract and bankruptcy preference
law. 6 The formalist contract-rights presumption, however, limits agree-
ments to their express written terms when the parties may have relied on
other methods of establishing or modifying a contract. 6' An inconsistent
standard for evaluating contractual conduct is more likely to force a court
to interpret a contract differently than intended or expected and thus un-
fairly to one or both parties."'
Finally, the formalist contract model ignores the issue of fairness to
third parties. Because the course of dealings between a creditor and a
debtor is more likely to be observed and relied upon by third-party credi-
tors than are predictions about a creditor's interpretation of express con-
tract terms, 170 limiting the interpretation of a contract to its express terms
and ignoring the historical and observed course of dealings between the
contract parties is unfair to other creditors; it "remakes" the contract
they observed and upsets their expectations.
Thus, the formalist contract-rights presumption may not protect the
parties from unfairness in contract interpretation. In fact, by limiting
courts' inquiries to express written contract terms that appear to be gen-
erally ignored, the presumption may inadvertently cause greater unfair-
ness, both to the parties of the contract and to third parties.
D. A New Standard
As a result of these considerations, I suggest that the formalist pre-
sumption be replaced by a multi-step inquiry consistent with the ap-
proach of modern contract and bankruptcy preference law. This Section
will outline that inquiry and its advantages.
1. A New Inquiry
First, courts should examine three factors in determining whether be-
havior constitutes inequitable conduct: (1) the express terms of the con-
167. See supra notes 63-85, 103-118 and accompanying text.
168. See supra Part II.
169. See supra notes 86-102, 119-121 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
171. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (discussing reliance); Joseph
William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988) (presenting vari-




tract between the parties; (2) the course of dealings between the parties
over time; and (3) the standard of conduct in dealings between similarly
situated parties. These three factors should be used to determine (1) to
what the parties have actually agreed-the nature of the contract-and
(2) whether any of them are engaged in conduct under the contract that
would (a) violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings as
understood in that contract or in similar contracts or (b) constitute un-
usual, extraordinary behavior committed outside the ordinary course of
business to the detriment of other creditors.
If either of these standards is violated, the court will then examine
both the intention of the parties and the effect of their actions and de-
termine whether the misconduct or breach rises to the level of clearly de-
fined "inequitable conduct" that is tantamount to fraud, overreaching
(within this context) or spoliation.' If this misconduct exceeds the high
standard of being tantamount to fraud, then it will be found to be inequi-
table conduct and the remaining steps of the analysis (determining
whether such conduct has injured other creditors and whether equitable
subordination will be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code 7 ) will be
pursued.
2. The Benefits
This substitute for the formalist contract-rights presumption has sev-
eral advantages. First, it evaluates relationships in greater detail and thus
identifies more clearly whether any misconduct occurred, and it does so
in a manner consistent with the approach of modem contract law 74 and
bankruptcy preference law.175 Second, by separately determining whether
any such misconduct rises to the level of inequitable conduct, this test en-
ables courts to evaluate misconduct consistently across modem contract,
bankruptcy preference, and equitable subordination law. Finally, modi-
fying the presumption in this manner will make such an inquiry consis-
tent with the general duty of bankruptcy courts to sift through the form
172. Cf. In re M. Paollela & Sons Inc., 161 B.R. 107, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (presenting similar
formulation).
173. See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977)
(outlining the requirements for equitable subordination). As an alternative, this same two part
inquiry could be used as a defense to a charge of inequitable behavior. If a creditor is accused of
inequitable behavior, she can raise a defense combining (1) the terms of the express contract;
(2) the course of dealings between the creditor and debtor; and (3) the course of dealings be-
tween similarly situated creditors and debtors to prove either (A) that no breach of good faith
and fair dealings or unusual detrimental activity occurred; or, failing that, (B) that such breach
of good faith and fair dealings or unusual detrimental activity did not rise to the level of inequi-
table conduct.
174. See supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 103-118 and accompanying text.
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to get at the true substance and to prevent superficial adherence to the
terms of a written contract to block the demands of equity."'
V. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy courts continue to experiment with equitable subordina-
tion and its slippery touchstone, inequitable conduct. In the constant
struggle to draw from the flexible and therefore chaotic principles of jus-
tice and equity, courts have started to develop bright-line rules and pre-
sumptions to divide legitimate from illegitimate conduct. Bankruptcy
courts, however, exist in the context of a rich and well developed uni-
verse of tests and approaches to understanding and characterizing be-
havior. Shaping bankruptcy rules so as to make them consistent with tests
in related areas will both capture important developments and lessons
from other areas of law and maintain the entire legal structure for evalu-
ating conduct. It will also continue to provide bankruptcy courts and the
bankruptcy system with the flexibility it needs to address questions of
equity.
The formalist contract-rights presumption, that conduct pursuant to
the express terms of a dontract is not inequitable, represents an important
if ill-conceived attempt at guiding courts' application of equitable subor-
dination. Modifying this presumption to account for developments in
modem contract law and the standards applied in bankruptcy preference
law will achieve the ends of the formalist presumption with greater accu-
racy and consistency. Separating the evaluation of misconduct from the
finding of misconduct will enable courts to use consistent standards with-
out sacrificing the courts' ability to deploy their equity powers precisely.
Equity powers must not be exercised so that form defeats the sub-
stance of justice. The formalist presumption should therefore be modified
to account for the substance of subjective and objective courses of deal-
ings between parties and not merely attend to the form of express con-
tract rights or terms.
176. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text. Hints of this methodology can be
found in a few cases. See Stratton v. Equitable Bank, 104 B.R. 713 (D. Md. 1989) (evaluating
inequitable conduct by examining sum of control); Pinetree Partners, Ltd. v. OTR (In re Pine-
tree Partners, Ltd.), 87 B.R. 481 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen
(In re Teltronics Serv. Inc.), 29 B.R. 139 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (evaluating totality of circum-
stances in flexible evaluation of control).
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